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Abstract
In this article we propose a novel measure of systemic risk in the context of financial networks.
To this aim, we provide a definition of systemic risk which is based on the structure, developed at
different levels, of clustered neighbours around the nodes of the network. The proposed measure
incorporates the generalized concept of clustering coefficient of order l of a node i introduced in
[10]. Its properties are also explored in terms of systemic risk assessment.
Empirical experiments on the time-varying global banking network show the effectiveness of the
presented systemic risk measure and provide insights on how systemic risk has changed over
the last years, also in the light of the recent financial crisis and the subsequent more stringent
regulation for globally systemically important banks.
Keywords: Systemic risk, Clustering coefficient, Community structures, Network analysis,
Cross-border banking
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1 Introduction
The recent financial distress and its spread over the world economic realities have pointed the
attention of practitioners and academics to the conceptualization and the management of systemic
∗Corresponding author.
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risk. Indeed, even if the starting point of the crisis is well localized in time and space – 2008 in the
US, with the failure of Lehman Brothers – the effects of this negative event have been and are still
pervasive quite everywhere.
The concept of systemic risk can be defined in a number of different ways, also on the basis of the
identification of the context under investigation (see e.g. [14], [22], [30]). Under a very general point
of view, systemic risk is the possibility that a negative occurrence at a local level might generate
a collapse at a global level. The premise for the introduction of systemic risk is the definition of a
system, which is nothing but a unified structure composed by distinct interconnected entities.
One of the most intuitive ways for modelling a systemic risk framework is through complex
networks (for a recent survey about networks and systemic risk, we can refer to [9] or [28]). In fact,
a network is a system composed by units – the so-called nodes – along with their interconnections
– arcs or edges. Thus, systemic risk is the possibility that an exogenous shock in one of the nodes
triggers the collapse of the entire network.
Therefore, it is not properly unexpected that several studies deal with systemic risk problems in
the framework of complex networks (see e.g. [5], [13], [15], [23], [24] [32], [35]).
The basis of systemic risk lies in the way in which shocks propagate among the nodes of the
network. Such a propagation is clearly strongly dependent on the position and the density of the
edges, i.e. on the topological structure of the graph associated to the network. Indeed, as intuition
suggests, the presence of a large number of interconnections leads to a more probable diffusion of
the local shocks, hence yielding a high level of systemic risk. In this respect, it is worth mentioning
[4], [6] and [25].
In the context of the relationship between interconnectedness and systemic risk, a relevant role
is played by the concept of community. With the term community we refer to a set of nodes whose
mutual links are of particular strength ([17], [19]). Thus, the assessment of the community structure
of a network let understand how powerful the mutual interconnections among the nodes are, hence
providing useful insights on the systemic risk. This argument suggests that the measurement of the
entity of the communities strength might represent a crucial step for the exploration of systemic
risk. In this respect, the clustering coefficient of a network is of peculiar relevance.
The clustering coefficient of a given node is a relative measure of the triangles including the
considered node as a vertex with respect to the hypothetical ones. Triangles are the easiest geometric
visualizations of the communities, since they offer the image of a nonexclusive interaction among
different agents. Such a measure has been developed in all the cases of weighted, unweighted,
directed and undirected networks (see e.g. [1], [11], [16], [29], [33] and [34]). The extension of
this community measure to the overall network is obtained by simply taking the average of all the
clustering coefficients of the nodes.
In line with [7], [27] and [31], this paper deals with the systemic risk assessment through the
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analysis of the clustering coefficient of a network.We move from a way to formalize a concept of com-
munity more general and informative than the standard clustering coefficient. In fact, communities
might be appreciated not only at the level of adjacent nodes, but also by considering nodes which
are at the periphery of the network. In so doing, we are adding a stratification of the communities
at different levels, in order to capture the presence of community effects at different distances from
the considered nodes.
To this aim, we employ the high order clustering coefficient, recently introduced by [10]. Fur-
thermore, we adapt it to the systemic risk context in order to assess how each node is embedded
in the entire system. In this way, we are providing specific indices that captures how a network is
clustered at different levels. Additionally, a global systemic risk index is defined with the purpose
of catching both the community structure around the node and the level of mutual interconnections
of nodes that are at a specific geodesic distance. In other words, it indicates the presence of high
(or low) clustered areas, revealing parts of the network where the risk diffusion could spread easily.
Furthermore, being this index defined as a weighted average of high order clustering coefficients
measured at different levels, we are able to modulate the effects of both adjacent and peripheral
nodes through the weights’ distribution. Indeed, we can take into major consideration either the
interactions of a node with its neighbours or the community structures generated by nodes at a wide
distance from the considered one.
Our theoretical proposal is validated over the paradigmatic example of Global Interbank Network,
which is particularly suitable for our purpose. Indeed, the network structure of national interbank
markets has been studied, at the global level, using the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
data set. Systemic risk is mainly related to the interbank context and the considered empirical data
allow to provide meaningful insights also to this type of literature (see, for instance, [7], [18], [21],
[20], [26], [27]).
We study the time-varying behaviour of the community structure of the global banking network
over the sample period that goes from the first quarter of 2005 to the end of 2017. Data naturally
induce a core-periphery network and then we focus on the behaviour of the core countries, i.e. coun-
tries whose banking systems report data to the BIS. In particular, to disentangle the role of core
countries that host global systemically important banks (GSIBs), as defined in the list provided
by the Financial Stability Board since november 2001, we will separately analyse the behaviour of
countries in which at least a GSIB is present. In other words, we start by measuring the community
structures at different levels on the basis of full global banking network’s topology over each quarter
of the year. Then, we compute high order clustering coefficients at a global level by focusing on two
different subsets: the set of countries in which at least a GSIB is present and the set containing other
core countries. In this way, we provide two alternative systemic risk indices that allow to assess the
state of risk and to describe the pattern over time for both groups.
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We observe that, in the entire period, countries, where a GSIB is present, show a clustering coefficient
higher than other core countries, confirming the important systemic role of the banks headquartered
in these countries. Our analysis confirms evidence of a reduction of global banking connectedness as
an effect of the cutback in cross-border lending, triggered by the subprime crisis and the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. Furthermore, results suggest a different pattern since 2011
between the two clusters. On one hand, other core countries show a tendency to diversify relation-
ships as the average number of transactions increases and the average volume remains quite stable.
On the other hand, lending countries, where a GSIB is present, are cutting their exposures in terms
of numbers and volumes. We interpret it as an effect of the “systemic risk score” introduced by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the end of 2011 and the effectiveness of GSIBs
regulation in inducing these banks to contain their systemic nature.
Furthermore, by providing a separate analysis between coefficients that considers only either in-flows
or out-flows, we describe the different behaviour of countries in terms of risk-driver or risk-taker.
It is worth mentioning how other core countries are more affected as risk taker. As regard to the
“out”coefficient we observe a greater value for countries where a GSIB is present in the period
2009-2011. It is also noticeable the reduction of GSIB systemic impact over the last years.
To sum up, the novelties of the present study are the following: first, we construct a new systemic
risk measure by using the concept of stratified communities. In so doing, we include in the systemic
risk assessment also core-periphery effects in the analysis of shocks propagation; second, we allow the
tuning of the systemic risk measure on specific levels of the communities, in order to give credit to the
action of peculiar parts of the considered network in assessing systemic risk. In this, we are basically
introducing a family of systemic risk measures with a wide set of meanings and interpretations;
third, we provide a deep analysis of the Global Interbanking System and infer aspects of the related
systemic risk which seem to remain unexplored in the standard frameworks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Preliminaries and notations are reported in
Section 2. We summarize general notation in Subsection 2.1, while in Subsection 2.2 it is described
the definition of the high order clustering coefficient introduced in [10], which is the basis of the
systemic risk measure defined below. In Section 3, we provide a new indicator of systemic risk based
on an extended version of the clustering coefficient. Some remarks on the systemic risk measure are
in Subsection 3.1. By means of a small example, Section 3.2 stresses the potential of our proposal
in respect to the classical weighted clustering coefficient defined in the literature. In Section 4, we
provide a deep analysis of the interbank system. Conclusions follow.
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2 Preliminaries and notation
We here present the mathematical definitions supporting the structure of the paper, for the conve-
nience of the reader.
2.1 General notation
We denote by G = (V,E) a graph, being V the set of n vertices and E the set of m arcs (or edges),
which are unordered pairs of vertices. Vertices i and j are said to be adjacent when (i, j) ∈ E. The
degree di of i is the number of the edges incident upon i. A path connecting vertices i and j is a
sequence of distinct vertices and edges between i and j. If there exists a path between i and j, then i
and j are said to be connected. The graph G is connected if all pairs of vertices of G are connected.
The distance d (i, j) is the length of any shortest path connecting i and j. Such a shortest path
is said to be a geodesic between i and j . All the geodesics between i and j have, of course, the
same length d (i, j) = l. We define the set Gij(l) as the one collecting all the geodesics connecting
the vertices i and j; the generic element of Gij(l) is g(l) = gij(l).
By conventional agreement, we assume that d (i, j) = ∞ when i and j are not connected. The
diameter of G, denoted by diam(G), is an integer given by the length of any longest path of G, and
can be properly defined once G is a connected graph.
For a connected graph, we define the set:
Ni(l) = {j ∈ V |d(i, j) = l},
with l = 1, . . . , diam(G), and use the notation |Ni(l)| = di(l) to represent its cardinality.
If any edge (i, j) ∈ E is associated to a positive real number wij , then both the edges and the
graph are weighted. Once we set that wij = 0 if and only if (i, j) /∈ E, then we can describe
completely the edges of the graph through the real n-square matrix W with entries wij , which is the
weighted adjacency matrix. In particular, if wij = 1 for all edges (i, j) ∈ E, then W is simply the
adjacency matrix A and the graph is unweighted. We will collapse this case into the more general
weighted one.
The strength of vertex i is the sum of the weights of the arcs incident upon i. We denote it by
si. Clearly, si = di in the unweighted case.
A weighted network is a graph with its weighted adjacency matrix.
The weight of a geodesic g(l) between i and j is given by the sum of the weights of its edges,
and will be denoted by wij(l, g) hereafter. From this concept, we introduce the l-th order strength
of the node i as
si(l) =
∑
j∈Ni(l)
wij(l),
with wij(l) = min
g(l)∈Gij(l)
{wij(l, g)}.
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When a direction is assigned to the edges of a graph G, then we obtain a directed graph D =
(V,E), and G represents the underlying graph of D. The directed edges of D are said arcs.
A directed path from i to j is a path whose arcs have the same direction, which is the one going
out from i and going in j. The existence of a directed path from i to j implies that j is reachable
from i. Such a directed path is said to be an out-path of i. In an intuitive way, one can say that the
geodesic distance
−→
d (i, j) from i to j is the length of a geodesic out-path (or out-geodesic) connecting
i and j, and it is set to
−→
d (i, j) =∞ when such an out-geodesic does not exist.
By reverting the argument above, one has that the out-path of i can be defined as an in-path
of j, and we denote by
←−
d (i, j) the length of any geodesic in-path (or in-geodesic), with the usual
agreement that
←−
d (i, j) =∞ when such an in-path does not exist.
The directed graph D is said to be strongly connected when all the pairs of two vertices are
mutually reachable. D is said to be weakly connected if the underlying graph G is connected.
By replacing d with
−→
d and
←−
d , one can rewrite the definitions of Ni(l), di(l), Gij(l), g(l) = gij(l),
wij , wij(l, g), si(l), wij(l) by
−→
N i(l),
−→
d i(l),
−→G ij(l), −→g (l) = −→g ij(l), −→w ij , −→w ij(l, g), −→s i(l), −→w ij(l) and
←−
N i(l),
←−
d i(l),
←−G ij(l), ←−g (l) =←−g ij(l), ←−w ij , ←−w ij(l, g), ←−s i(l), ←−w ij(l), respectively.
2.2 The high order clustering coefficient
We now report the definition of the high order clustering coefficient introduced in [10], which is the
basis of the systemic risk measure defined below.
In case of a weighted, undirected and connected graph G, we initially define a matrix P(l) =
[pij(l)]i,j∈V for l = 1, . . . , diam(G), whose entries are
pij(l) =

wij(l)
si(l)
if j ∈ Ni(l) and Ni(l) 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
(1)
where c = [ci]i∈V is the vector whose element ci is the weighted local clustering coefficient of the
node i (see [1]). If l = 0, we define P(l) = I, where I is the identity matrix.
The local clustering coefficient of order l is c(l) = [ci(l)]i∈V , obtained as
c(l) = P(l)c. (2)
If the graph is directed, weighted and weakly connected, matrix P(l) in (1) becomes P¯(l) with
entries:
p¯ij(l) =

w¯ij(l)
s¯i(l)
if j ∈ N¯i(l) and N¯i(l) 6= ∅,
0 otherwise,
(3)
where:
(a) N¯i(l) =
−→
N i(l), w¯i,j(l) =
−→w ij(l) and s¯i(l) = −→s i(l) in case only out-paths of node i are taken
into account, and P¯(l) =
−→
P(l);
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(b) N¯i(l) =
←−
N i(l), w¯i,j(l) =
←−w ij(l) and s¯i(l) = ←−s i(l), considering only in-paths of i, and P¯(l) =
←−
P(l);
(c) N¯i(l) = Ni(l), w¯i,j(l) = wij(l) and s¯i(l) = si(l) when all directions are considered, and
P¯(l) = P(l).
In all the previous cases, we assume P¯(0) = I.
The local clustering coefficient of order l in (2) can be defined, respectively, for cases (a), (b) and
(c), as follows:
cin(l) =
←−
P(l)cin. (4)
cout(l) =
−→
P(l)cout. (5)
call(l) = P(l)call. (6)
where cin = [cini ]i∈V and c
out = [couti ]i∈V are vectors with entries c
in
i and c
out
i , respectively, that
represent the in and out weighted local clustering coefficients of node i, while call is the vector of
local clustering coefficient for graph D (see [11]).
3 Systemic risk measure
We here propose a new indicator of systemic risk based on an extended version of the clustering
coefficient described in the previous Section and which seems to be particularly effective for our
purpose.
If the case of an undirected graph, we introduce the vector h = [h(l)]l=0,··· ,diam(G) such that
h(l) =
1
N
∑
i∈V
ci(l). (7)
Observe that h(l) provides a feedback on how the nodes of the network are clustered together at
a specific level l, being the mean of the clustering coefficients of order l. Then, the vector h collects
the measures of all clusters. As a consequence, the distribution of its elements could give insights on
the systemic risk of the network at each level l, as we will better be explained in the next Subsection.
This suggests, as a quite natural further step, to use the elements of h to define a new measure of
systemic risk. We define the index h?, based on the h’s, by taking their weighted mean as follows:
h? =
diam(G)∑
l=0
xlh(l), (8)
where xl ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑diam(G)
l=0 xl = 1.
Notice that by means of h? we are providing a specific systemic risk index that considers how
each node is embedded in the network. In particular, the measure takes into account either the
whole community structure around each node as well as the level of mutual interconnection of the
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nodes at a geodesic distance l ≥ 1. The presence of xl allows to introduce some flexibility in the
computation of h?. Some remarks about possible distribution of xl are reported in Subsection 3.1.
Moreover, the effect of different weights xl will be tested in the numerical Section.
Also, observe that proposing this measure we are in line with the scientific debate on how clustering
coefficient of a network might be viewed as a measure of systemic risk (see e.g. [27] and [31]).
Analogously to formula (7), in the case of directed graph D, we can define hin = [hin(l)]l=0,··· ,diam(G),
hout = [hout(l)]l=0,··· ,diam(G) and h
all = [hall(l)]l=0,··· ,diam(G) where
hin(l) =
1
N
∑
i∈V
cini (l), h
out(l) =
1
N
∑
i∈V
couti (l), h
all(l) =
1
N
∑
i∈V
calli (l), (9)
and, in this case, the global clustering coefficients are:
hin,? =
diam(G)∑
l=0
xlh
in(l), hout,? =
diam(G)∑
l=0
xlh
out(l), hall,? =
diam(G)∑
l=0
xlh
all(l). (10)
According to the literature which states that a high value of clustering coefficient is associated
to a high level of systemic risk, we assume that the highest the value of h?’s in (8) and (10), the
highest the systemic risk of the network.
3.1 Some remarks on the systemic risk measure
Notice that the coefficient xl in (8) and (10) represents the “weight” to be assigned to h(l) in the
analysis of the entire community structure related to the nodes of the network.As already pointed
out, h(l) brings information on the community structure at level l. In this respect, the selection of
a specific distribution for the x’s leads to different ways to include the periphery of the graph in the
systemic risk measurement.
A high concentration at a specific level l could indicate a particular attention to a more clustered
area, revealing the intuition of the policy maker to focus on a part of the network where the risk
diffusion could spread easily. For instance, if the mass of the weights x’s is concentrated over the
small values of l, then the considered systemic risk measure will take into major consideration the
community structures close to the nodes of the graph. Differently, the case of concentration of the
x’s over large values of l is associated to a systemic risk more sensitive to communities far from the
nodes.
The corner case xl = 1 reduces the vectors h’s to the clustering coefficients of order l. In this
particular situation, systemic risk measures h?’s take into consideration communities at geodesic
distance l from the nodes. This analysis might be relevant for the assessment of the stratified
community structure of the network. Indeed, a complete analysis of the corner cases xl = 1 with
l = 0, 1, . . . , diam(G) allows to characterize the vulnerability of the network and its ability of ab-
sorbing shocks by assessing the presence of core-periphery communities. Notice that the very special
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case of xl = 1 for l = 0 is the standard conceptualization of the clustering coefficient.
Moreover, the distinction between directed and undirected graphs leads to remarkable differences
in the definition of the systemic risk measure of the network. When dealing with undirected graph,
strong communities are associated to high values of the weights between the unordered couples of
nodes forming an edge (see formula (2)), and this property is clearly included in the definition of the
systemic risk measure, defined through formula (8). In the directed case, weights should be intended
with a direction and the couples of nodes become ordered. Thus, a node can be associated to a
strong community in terms of in-paths and a weak one when considering the out-paths (see (4) and
(5)). Such a characteristic of the nodes represents the basis of a concept of “directed” systemic risk
measure (see hin,? and hout,? in (10)), and this contributes to the understanding of the vulnerability
of the network. Indeed, a shock occurring at a node i ∈ V with a high level of houti is expected to
be rapidly propagated to the other nodes of the network, while a high value of hini is associated to
a probable infection of node i when the shock comes from outside it.
3.2 Simulated example
To show the effectiveness of the proposed high order clustering coefficients in capturing how a
network is clustered at different levels – hence leading to a a powerful definition of a systemic risk
measure, as presented in the previous section – we provide a simple weighted and directed graph D
of 12 nodes (see Figure 1). This allows to easily stress the potential of the index h(l) in respect to
the classical weighted clustering coefficient defined in the literature.
We recall that the clustering coefficient should reflect the combined effect of the weights and the
presence of triangles. Notice that, we focus on a directed graph since the vector of high order clus-
tering coefficients c(l) of the underlying graph G can be obtained by simply rescaling the coefficients
of D (see [10] for details).
Since the graph is directed, we can refer to different kind of geodesics (depending on whether
the direction of the arcs is considered or not). We first compute the vector call of coefficients as
provided in [11]. We remind that each coefficient calli includes all kind of triangles which a node
belongs to.
We then evaluate clustering coefficients of order l by means of formula (6). Values are reported in
Table 1.
First, some remarks on the values of high order coefficients should be done. Looking at the
clustering call(0), the node 1 has the lowest positive value (0.028), being part of triangles with
low weights. This seems to suggest that node 1 is not remarkable in the context of communities.
However, this value does not reflect the fact that the node 1 is adjacent to nodes with maximum
9
Figure 1: The simple weighted and directed graph D. Edges’ opacity is proportional to weights.
Node call(0) call(1) call(2) call(3)
1 0.028 0.204 0.5 0
2 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
3 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
4 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
5 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
6 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
7 0.5 0.421 0.232 0.5
8 0 0.028 0.458 0.5
9 0.5 0.144 0.396 0
10 0.167 0.482 0.261 0
11 0.5 0.333 0.300 0.387
12 0.5 0.333 0.300 0.387
hall(l) 0.391 0.338 0.300 0.356
Table 1: Clustering coefficients and systemic risk indicators of order l for the graph D when all
paths are considered (neglecting directions).
clustering. In other words, the interconnection with high clustered nodes is softened by the presence
of low weights. In addition, from node 1 we reach nodes 11 and 12 in two steps, having clustering
equal to 0.5. The coefficients of order 1 and 2 (call1 (1) = 0.204, c
all
1 (2) = 0.5) are increasing, showing
that an higher order of clustering is able to capture the intensity of the communities around the
10
xl h
all,?
Decreasing Weights 0.360
Uniform Weights 0.346
Increasing Weights 0.340
Table 2: Values of the global systemic risk measure hall,? for different weights’ distribution
node at distances greater than 1.
Node 10 has the second lowest value (call10 (0) = 0.167), but the value of c
all
10 (1) is almost three
times. This suggests that the node forms communities with adjacent nodes with maximum clustering.
It is worth noting the case of the node 8. This node does not contribute to form triangles, then
its clustering coefficient is equal to zero. However, it has only one adjacent node and its direct
connection with node 1 implies that the coefficient at level 1 completely absorbs the clustering value
of the node 1. Also, clustering coefficients of order 2 and 3 are extremely high, due to connections
to high clustered nodes through geodesics of length 2 and 3. These aspects allow to interpret the
position of this node in a completely different perspective, especially in spreading risk.
The value of hall,∗ synthesizes the overall community structure of the network, thus providing a
measure of the systemic risk associated to it. The choice of weights xl can modulate the intensity of
the measure h(l) in formula (10), giving to this global network indicator a high degree of flexibility.
Here three possible scenarios for the weights x’s are considered:
• Decreasing weights xl = (l+1)
−1∑diam(G)
l=0 (l+1)
−1 =
(l+1)−1
HG
where HG is the harmonic number of order
diam(G) + 1.
• Uniform weights xl = 1diam(G)+1
• Increasing weights xl = (l+1)∑diam(G)
l=0 (l+1)
= 2(l+1)(diam(G)+1)(diam(G)+2)
For instance, assuming that weights xl are decreasing, we are reducing the impact of h(l) respect
the whole system when the distance l increases.
In this example, values of h(l) state, on average, the presence of a strong community structure
around the single node, as well as mutual interconnections at the maximal geodesic distance. As
a consequence, both the closest and peripheral nodes have, on average, a similar influence on the
node. In this regard, the distribution of weights is not very informative in this case. Indeed, different
weights lead to very close values of hall,? (see Table 2).
Moving to the analysis of the directed case, we can separately investigate patterns of in or
out-clustering by using formulae (4) and (5).
Values are reported in Tables 3 and 2, respectively. According to in-clustering, the vector cin(0)
considers in-triangles which a node belongs to. Referring to the 1st order, only two nodes (11 and
11
12) are reachable from a node with a positive in-clustering coefficient (i.e. the node 10). Notice that
cin12(1) is one half of c
in
11(1) because the node is also reachable from 11.
Respect to the out-clustering, the node 8 is of interest; indeed, although its clustering coefficient
is equal to zero, this node has positive coefficients of order 1 and 2, due to its connections via
out-paths to nodes involved in out-triangles.
From the evaluation of the in- and out-patterns, a different behaviour in terms of systemic risk
emerges, reflected by measures hin,? and hout,?. The graph has a structure that seems more sensitive
in receiving than spreading risk, and this characteristic is persistent also with different weights’
distributions (Table 4). In particular, the community structure at level 0 favours the receiving of
the risk (captured by the highest hin(0)). There is the presence of few nodes that spread risk also
to peripheral nodes.
Node cin(0) cin(1) cin(2) cin(3) cout(0) cout(1) cout(2) cout(3)
1 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.063 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.063 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0.500 0 0
10 0.50 0 0 0 0.500 0 0 0
11 0 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0.50 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average 0.208 0.063 0 0 0.048 0.053 0.005 0
Table 3: Clustering coefficients and systemic risk indicators of order l for the graph D considering
either in-paths or out-paths.
xl h
in,? hout,?
Decreasing Weights 0.115 0.036
Uniform Weights 0.068 0.026
Increasing Weights 0.035 0.015
Table 4: Values of the global systemic risk measure hin,? and hall,? for different weights’ distribution
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4 Numerical Analysis
As in [7], [21] and [27] we designed a global banking network using the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS) consolidated statistics, which measure bank exposures to different countries. These
statistics capture worldwide-consolidated claims of internationally active banks headquartered in
BIS reporting countries. In particular, we consider international claims by a reporting country to-
ward banks in counterparty countries. In this way, we focus on the lending activity of international
banks. Here, nodes are countries and weighted arcs represent positive cross-border exposures.
We model each quarter of the year over the sample period (from the first quarter of 2005 to the
end of 2017) through a single network, each one referred to links between banks of approximately
200 countries1. Figure 2 depicts the network at four different time periods. Density is equal to 0.046
at the 4th quarter of 2005, then the network is sparse. It is noticeable that networks become slowly
denser over time (in terms of the number of transactions): density is indeed equal to 0.055 at the
end of the time-period (4Q-2017). The number of arcs moves from 1540 to 2513 over the sample
period, while the number of countries remains stable. The majority of countries is separated by at
most two steps. Only very few countries are reachable with three steps.
Figure 2: Cross-border global banking networks as on the end of 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Red
arrows represent arcs. Arcs opacity is proportional to weights (i.e., intensity of the exposures).
1The number of countries varies according to different time-periods. Indeed, few isolated nodes are present at
specific times.
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As also shown in Figure 2, data are designed so that the resulting networks are characterized
by core - periphery structures2. The core group consists of countries whose banking systems report
data to the BIS in the analysed time-period, whereas other countries belong to the periphery group.
According to the BIS data, periphery countries are analysed only as borrowers because for their
banking systems only information on inflows is available. Thus, the selection of the core is strictly
dependent on the data structure provided by the BIS. Table 5 shows the list of 24 core countries
which reported to the BIS data about incoming and outgoing exposures of international financial
claims.
A specific analysis will regard also a subset of the core countries that host global systemically
important banks (GSIBs)3. Since November 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) releases the
list of G-SIBs each year, based on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) score of
systemic risk (see [2] and [3]). These banks are asked to hold more capital (on top of Basel 3) and
are subject to regulations that are more stringent. In particular, we will define GSI Countries, those
countries in which at least a G-SIB is present (see Table 5 for a list of GSIB countries).
In order to understand the role of G-SIB, we will separate countries in three different clusters.
In particular, we focus on GSI countries and other core countries (i.e. core countries that are not
classified as GSI). A third residual group considers periphery countries. Figure 3 gives an idea of the
role of different countries in the network at two different time periods. It is remarkable that specific
core countries become more integrated in the dense part of the network by increasing, in particular,
their out-flows.
According to this classification, we are able to compute global indicators based on a specific subset
of countries. Initially, we compute classical local clustering coefficients calli (0) for the weighted and
directed network (see [11]) and we aggregate these local coefficients separately for GSI and other
core countries. Hence, we obtain two different estimates of hall(0) according to two different subsets
of nodes.
In the entire period, GSI countries show a clustering coefficient higher than other core countries,
confirming the important systemic role of the banks headquartered in these countries (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, results suggest a different pattern between the two clusters of countries. In particular,
GSI countries show a fall in clustering, starting from year-end 2008. This reduction is in line with
the general reduction of clustering for the full network in 2009-2010, provided in [27] and ascribed
to the perturbation in financial markets triggered by the Lehman failure.
It is interesting to notice that financial communities tends to weaken after the year 2011 for GSI
2In network theory, a core-periphery structure identifies a well-designed network model such that some nodes are
densely connected, whereas others are sparsely connected, in a peripheral position (see [8]).
3See the FSB website for the updated list of G-SIBS banks (http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-publishes-
2017-g-sib-list/) and the BCBS website for more information on how to assess systemically important banks
(https://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/)
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Australia (AU) Core
Austria (AT) Core
Belgium (BE) Core GSI
Canada (CA) Core
Chile (CL) Core
China (CN) GSI
China Taipei (TW) Core
Finland (FI) Core
France (FR) Core GSI
Germany (DE) Core GSI
Greece (GR) Core
India (IN) Core
Ireland (IE) Core
Italy (IT) Core GSI
Japan (JP) Core GSI
Netherlands (NL) Core GSI
Norway (NO) Core
Portugal (PT) Core
Singapore (SG) Core
Spain (ES) Core GSI
Sweden (SE) Core GSI
Switzerland (CH) Core GSI
Turkey (TR) Core
United Kingdom (GB) Core GSI
United States (US) Core GSI
Table 5: List of core countries and countries where at least one GSIB has its headquarters.
countries. This phenomenon is also more intense starting from 2013, the year when the BCBS revised
its methodology to assess GSIBs and the higher loss absorbency requirement, to better comply with
the purpose of reducing the extent of failure of these banks.
This behaviour is partially explained by the pattern of out-degree and out-strength reported in
Figure 5. There is a tendency in the network, particularly with other core countries, to diversify
relationships as the average number of transactions increases and the average volume remains quite
stable. The same pattern is not observed for GSI countries. In particular, considering the volume of
transactions, evidence suggests that GSI countries are cutting their exposures to almost all partners.
This behaviour provides an evidence of the effectiveness of the regulation, dampening the GSIB
systemic impact.
In order to test the behaviour of clustering coefficients of order l, we compute call(1) by means
of formula (6). In order to obtain two values of the synthetic indicator, one for GSI subset and one
for other core countries subset, we average local coefficients of order 1 of countries belonging to the
same subset. Results are reported in Figure 6.
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Figure 3: Cross-border global banking networks as on the end of 2005 and 2017 with the evidence
of GSI, other core and periphery countries.
Figure 4: Global clustering Coefficients hall(0) computed by averaging local coefficients calli (0) at
two different levels considering either only GSI countries or only other core countries respectively.
We examine, in this way, the systemic risk at different observation scales. While classical clus-
tering coefficient calli takes into account how the node i form communities in the context of the
overall system, calli (1) measures how much the neighbours of node i form triangles and communities.
Patterns of Figure 6 show that GSI countries are also connected to well-established communities
confirming the central role of these countries in term of systemic risk.
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Figure 5: Out-degree and out-strength for GSI and other core countries.
It is worth mentioning that GSI countries, against the reduction of average number and volume
of transactions, maintain a high-level of communities, captured by hall(1), due to their relations
with neighbours that belong to many triangles. This effect is partially induced by the contraction of
lending activity towards periphery countries, leading to an increase of clustering coefficient of order
1.
On the left side, Figure 7 depicts global clustering coefficients of order 2 (hall(2)) computed for
the two subsets of countries. A similar pattern between GSI and other core countries is observed,
specially over the last period. This behaviour can be partially explained by observing the ratio of
geodesics of length 1 to the total number of geodesics for each cluster of countries (Figure 7, right
side). Indeed, as already seen in Figure 5, the average number of borrowers for the two subsets of
lenders behaves in a opposite manner since 2008-2009. On one hand, GSI countries reduced the
average number of transactions, on the other hand, other core countries increase it. At the end of
the period, very close out-degrees are observed for both subsets, so that the percentage of nodes
at distance 1 becomes very similar and clustering coefficient of order 2 is obviously affected by this
fact. Additionally, the similarity of the 2-order clustering coefficients displays that both subsets are
connected in two steps to comparable communities.
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Figure 6: Global clustering coefficients of order 1 hall(1) computed by averaging local coefficients
calli (1) at two different levels considering either only GSI countries or only other core countries
respectively.
Figure 7: On the left side, Figure shows global clustering coefficients of order 2 hall(2) computed
by averaging local coefficients calli (2) at two different levels considering either only GSI countries or
only other core countries respectively. On the right side, Figure displays the percentage of geodesic
of length 1 with respect to the total for each cluster (GSI and other core countries)
Figure 8 shows the high order clustering hall,∗ computed by considering different choices of
weights, for both subsets of countries. Specifically, we test here the same distributions of weights de-
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scribed in Section 3.2, reporting the results in Figure 8. A different weights’ concentration produces
distinct patterns, in terms of comparison between GSI and other countries. Focusing, for instance,
on a decreasing distribution, it is confirmed the prominent role of GSI countries in spreading and
receiving risk to (and from) their neighbours. On the contrary, assigning more weight to the rela-
tionships between nodes at higher distance, other core countries tend to have a pattern in line with
GSI countries. Hence, we provide here a different view of systemic risk: unless GSI countries surely
play a key role in spreading and receiving risk, by looking beyond the adjacent nodes, we deduce
that also banks of other core countries can significantly contribute to risk diffusion. Furthermore,
independently from the weights’ distribution, in all cases, we have that the behaviour of both subsets
tends to be aligned over the last years.
Figure 8: Figure reports the high order clustering coefficient for different choices of weights, where
hall,∗ is computed by averaging local coefficients for the two subsets of countries.
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The numerical analysis has been also extended by considering in a separate way only either in-
paths or out-paths. In this way, we catch only the effect of community structures in spreading or
receiving risk. To this aim, we report in Figure 9 values of hin(0) and hout(0) for both subsets of
countries. It is worth mentioning the different pattern between other core and GSI countries. The
former ones tend to have higher connections of the in-type to their neighbours. GSI countries have
instead, on average, an higher role in spreading risk towards their adjacent nodes. In particular, it is
noticeable the specific pattern hout(0) for GSI countries since the end of 2011. Indeed, the structure
of financial communities of out-type tends to weaken, with a significant decrease from 2013, probably
due to the reaction of banks in these countries to the systemic risk regulation.
Figure 9: In and out clustering coefficients hin(0) and hout(0). Both coefficients are computed
by averaging local coefficients considering either only GSI countries or only other core countries
respectively.
As regard to level 1, we have a very different picture of the network (see Figure 10). GSI countries
tend to show an higher level of connections of the in-type with strong community structures. On
other hand, GSI countries spread, on average, risk toward countries that have lower out-clustering
coefficients hout(0). So it is interesting to note that, in this case, there is only a low further propaga-
tion of risk. On other hand, we observe an increasing pattern of hout(1) for core countries over time
showing that banks of these countries are more and more connected to banks of risk-giver countries.
Values of hin(2) and hout(2) have been reported in Figure 11. In these networks, the maximal
length of in-geodesics is equal to 2. However, we have a very low proportion of countries (see Figure
12, left side) that are reachable in two steps via an in-path4. So, differences observed for the hin(2)
4The ratio of in-geodesics of length 1 to the total number of in-geodesics is equal to 96% for GSI countries and
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Figure 10: In and out clustering coefficients of order 1, hin(1) and hout(1). Both coefficients are
computed by averaging local coefficients considering either only GSI countries or only other core
countries respectively.
clustering between the two subsets are mainly motivated by the behaviour of specific countries. On
average, other core countries, when act as borrowers, are more connected, via in-paths of length 2,
to strong community structure. Concerning the out-clustering of level 2, all core countries show very
low connections. Although, over time, the percentages of out-distances of length 2 is reducing for
GSI countries and increasing for other core countries, all countries are, on average, mostly connected
at distance 2 with peripheral countries characterized by low risk.
Now, we focus on the systemic risk measures hin,? and hout,? regarding in and out-flows respec-
tively (see Figure 13). As stressed in [31], an higher clustering coefficient of the in-type may reflect
higher systemic risk because failure of the borrowing node in an in triangle can trigger simulta-
neous non-repayments to the lending nodes, and this can make them unable to honour their own
obligations. We show that both the in-clustering and the hin,? assess the high state of stress in
the network. It is worth mentioning how other core countries are more affected as risk taker than
GSI countries. This effect is more evident when weights are more concentrated on adjacent nodes
because of the high level of interaction of these countries as borrowers. It is instead more noticeable
the effect of weights’ distribution on GSI countries. We have indeed that values of hin,? for this
subset are decreasing approximatively from 0.87 to 0.7 when increasing weights are chosen. These
countries are less affected, when they act as borrowers, by the effect of countries that are at higher
distances. Differently focusing on hout,?, we observe a greater value for GSI countries in the period
2009-2011. It is also confirmed the reduction of GSIB systemic impact over the last years, mainly
around 90% for other core countries.
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Figure 11: In and Out Clustering of order 2, hin(2) and hout(2). Both coefficients are computed
by averaging local coefficients considering either only GSI countries or only other core countries
respectively.
Figure 12: Percentages of directed (in and out respectively) geodesic of length 1 with respect to the
total for each cluster (GSI and other core countries)
characterized by the reduction of the exposure of GSI countries.
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Figure 13: In and out high order clustering coefficients h?,in and h?,out. Coefficients are computed
for both subsets of countries and with different weights.
5 Conclusions
Systemic risk in finance is a concept not easy to be formalized through a quantitative measure and
a huge and fast growing literature is interested in this issue. A quite natural approach is based on
the use of complex networks.
In a financial system, the interconnectedness among entities plays a fundamental role in situations
of distress. Moving from this fact, we exploit the concept of community, usually relevant in under-
standing the relationship between interconnectedness and systemic risk. In particular, we consider a
generalization of the concept of clustering coefficient in order to catch both the presence of clustered
areas around a node and/or high levels of mutual interconnections at different distances from the
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node itself. We provide a new systemic risk measure computed as the weighted average of high order
clustering coefficients at different levels. On one hand, this proposal leads to a synthetic indicator
able to assess the general state of stress of the financial system. On the other hand, the distribution
of weights allows to introduce a degree of flexibility, in order to modulate the effects of both adjacent
nodes and peripheral nodes.
An empirical application to time-varying global banking network is developed. Results show the
effectiveness of these measures in reflecting how systemic risk has changed over the last years, also
in the light of the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, we emphasize a different pattern of behaviour
between countries where a GSIB is headquartered and other core countries, more noticeable since
2013. This effect, that could be interpreted as a reaction to the specific regulation inducing banks
to contain their “systemic”nature, is in line with the recent report by the Committee on the Global
Financial System [12] that shows that GSIBs become more selective and have also repositioned
themselves toward less complex activities, as a response to the regulatory reforms process that is
under way.
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